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Using civilians as shields*
Cécile Fabre
Draft II
1. Introduction
The principle of civilians immunity, whereby civilians are given a range of protections in war, is a
central tenet of both just war ethics and the laws of war. Yet, it is a well-documented feature of socalled new wars that belligerents tend to withhold those protections from civilians; in addition, they
use tactics which exploit their enemy’s unwillingness to do precisely that. 1 One such tactics is the use
of civilians as human shields. Others include the deliberate targeting of civilians, or dressing up as a
civilians so as to approach the enemy’s installations and personnel safely, thereby maximising their
chances of destroying them.
None of those tactics are new – nor is the general problem of asymmetry between
belligerents. However, addressing the ethical issues raised by asymmetrical warfare is particularly
pressing for a cosmopolitan account of the just war. For as we have seen throughout this book, such
an account regards as just causes rights violations which can be blocked only by resorting to the
aforementioned means. The cosmopolitan account thus faces the following dilemma: 2 either it
denies the weak the right to resort to those means, which is tantamount to denying them the right to
go to war; or it grants them that right, in which case it weakens standard protections afforded to
civilians. Yet, surely we want the weak to be able to protect their rights, if necessary by force, against
wrongdoers. At the same time, surely we want to minimise harm to civilians.
My aim, in this paper, is to tackle this dilemma, by focusing on the coercive use of civilians
as shields. Human shields are a depressingly familiar feature of contemporary wars. Here are some
examples. In May 2002, the Israeli Defense Force invaded the Palestinian refugee camp of Jenin in
the West Bank, as part of its Operation Defensive Shield Campaign. Israeli authorities claimed to have
intelligence that the camp was used as a base by Palestinian terrorists to launch attacks on Israeli
villages. During and after the battle, allegations were made by both parties, and documented by
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, that Palestinian civilians had been used as shields
– for example by being forced to stand in front of soldiers while the latter shot at their enemy, or by
having their houses used, without their consent, as shooting bases and being prevented from leaving
them. 3 Similarly, testimonies from the conflict which opposes the Sri Lankan authorities with
* A first draft of this paper was presented at the Edinburgh Research Seminar in Political Theory in November 2009,
whose participants made a number of helpful comments. I am grateful to Alejandro Chehtman for his written comments
on that earlier draft.
1 See, e.g., I. Duyvesteyn and J. Angstrom (eds.), Rethinking the Nature of War (London: Frank Cass, 2005), R. Geiβ,
'Asymmetric Conflict Structures', International Review of the Red Cross 88 (2006): 757-77; F. Hampson, 'Winning by the
Rules: Law and Warfare in the 1980s', Third World Quarterly 11 (1989): 31-62; M. Kaldor, New & Old Wars (2nd edn.;
Cambridge: Polity, 2006), and H. Munkler, The New Wars (Oxford: Polity, 2005).
2 D. Rodin, 'The Ethics of Asymmetric War', in Richard Sorabji and David Rodin (eds.), The Ethics of War: Shared Problems
in Different Traditions (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
3 See Amnesty International, ‘Gaza: Military Tactics on Both Sides Endangering Civilians’, (Amnesty International: 0801-2009) <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=18000>, (Access-08-01-2009).(accessed on 10-092009); Human Rights Watch, ‘Israel/Occupied Territories: Jenin War Crimes Investigation Needed’, (Human Rights
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separatist Tamil Tigers suggest that the latter have also been using civilians as human shields. 4 The
Rwandan conflict provides yet another example of such tactics. According to a number of sources,
Hutus militias, which had been defeated in the 1994 civil war, used refugee camps in Zaire between
1994 and 1997 as bases for launching attacks into Rwanda – departing from the camps and returning
after fighting, in the knowledge that their opponents would hesitate to pursue them there precisely
because of the risks for refugees posed by a battle within the camps. 5 Finally, during the US-led
Operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003, the then-Iraqi regime and military authorities were widely reported to
as coercively using civilians as shields, for example by ordering their soldiers to drive next to civilian
cars as soon as Coalition helicopters appeared. 6
The foregoing examples suggest that there are broadly two ways in which belligerents use
civilians as shields: by forcibly positioning them in the line of fire, or by drawing the fight into
densely populated areas. In both cases, the party who so acts – in the present context, militarily
weaker belligerent W – relies on the fact that its enemy - militarily powerful belligerent P - will want
to (be seen to) respect the principle of non-combatant immunity and will thus have a narrower range
of strategic options. 7 In both cases, the practice is prohibited by the laws of war. Thus, according to
article 51(7) of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, ‘the presence or
movement of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain
points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military
objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the
conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order
to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.’ 8
Not only is the practice unlawful: it also elicits near-universal moral condemnation. A
cursory look at the contemporary literature on human shields reveals, first, that scholars assume,
Watch:
02-05-2002)
<http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/05/02/israeloccupied-territories-jenin-war-crimesinvestigation-needed>, (Access-02-05-2002). (accessed on 10-09-2009); Human Rights Watch, ‘Israel: Decision to Stop
Use
Of
"Human
Shields
Welcomed’,
(Human
Rights
Watch:
09-05-2002)
<http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/05/09/israel-decision-stop-use-human-shields-welcomed>,
(Access-09-052002).(accessed on 10-09-2009). A recent UN report into human rights abuse by both Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian
Authority into the Occupied Territories reports similar incidents. See United Nations, Human Rights in Palestine and Other
Occupied Territories - Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, (United Nations: 15/09/2009)
<http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2009/09/15/UNFFMGCReport.pdf>,
(Access15/09/2009).(accessed on 17-09-09).
4 See, e.g., Amnesty International, ‘Sri Lanka: Un Security Council Must Demand Immediate Access and Accountability’,
(Amnesty International: <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=18235>, (accessed on 10-09-2009).
5 Source??
6 See M. N. Schmitt, 'Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law', International Review of the Red Cross 87 (2005):
445-66, at 458 (and ft 45).
7 For a useful discussion of the advantages gained in those ways by the Taleban’s in Afghanistan over the US-led
coalition in 2002 (and of similar issues raised by the NATO campaign in Kosovo), see, e.g., B. Kashnikov, ''Target
Approval Delays Cost Air Force Key Hits'', Journal of Military Ethics 1 (2002): 125-28; O. O'Donovan, The Just War
Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); T. Ricks, 'Target Approval Delays Cost Air Force Key Hits',
Journal of Military Ethics 1 (2002): 109-13; M. Schmitt, ''Target Approval Delays Cost Air Force Key Hits': Law, Policy,
Ethics and the Warfighter's Dilemma', Journal of Military Ethics 1 (2002): 113-25; T. Westhusing, ''Target Approval Delays
Cost Air Force Key Hits': Targeting Terror: Killing Al Qaeda the Right Way', Journal of Military Ethics 1 (2002): 128-36
8 See article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. For a good summary of the legal position, see, e.g., R. Lyall,
'Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International Humanitarian Law Obligations of
States ', Melbourne Journal of International Law 9 (2008): 1-21.
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rather than argue, that it is morally wrong and, second, that the crucial issue, in their view, is whether
combatants may target civilians whom they believe to be shielding enemy combatants, or, indeed, to
be combatants dressed as shields. 9 In this paper, I shall focus on the morality of using (as opposed
to targeting) civilians as shields. I shall argue that civilians – whether on W’s side or on P’s side – are
sometimes under a moral duty to offer their services as shields in prosecution of W’s (just) war. By
implication, then, I shall argue that W sometimes may seek to 10 use those civilians as shields. Further,
when assessing whether W wrongs civilians, we shall have to bear in mind the following distinction
between two issues: (a) whether the harm which W themselves inflict, or risk inflicting, on shields is
wrongful, and (b) whether the wrongful harm which P inflict or risk inflict on shields as a result of
W’s use of the latter is one for which W are responsible as well, so much so that they may not, in
fact, resort to such tactics. To illustrate, suppose that W take the fight into densely populated areas
in order to make it more difficult for P to identify who is a combatant and who is not. If P do not
desist from fighting, non-combating residents in those areas will be at risk of dying at the hands of
both W and P: for it is likely that both W and P will carry out acts of killing against one another at
the risk of unintentionally killing civilians; or it may well be that P will deliberately target those
civilians in sheer frustration at W’s refusal to fight out in the open. It is one thing to claim that W
may themselves impose such a risk on those residents; it is another to claim that they may take the
fight in those areas knowing that the residents will be at even greater risks at the hands of P. In
sections 2 and 3, I will address the question of whether W may inflict on civilians the harm attendant
on being coercively used as a shields, focusing first on W’s use of its own civilians, before turning to
its use of P’s civilians. 11 In section 4, I will discuss the problem of intervening agency, as raised by
(b). Finally, in section 5, I will tackle two often-raised objections to the use of shields by belligerents,
to wit, that they are unfair to the enemy, and that they undermine the principle of non-combatant
immunity.
Three final remarks before I start. First, I posit that W have a reasonable chance of success
against P if they resort to asymmetrical tactics. In addition, W have a just cause against their unjust
enemy P. For as I assume throughout this paper, combatants’ right to kill depends on the justness of
their cause. If W’s cause were unjust, it simply would not be allowed to wage war against P, which
would render the problem of asymmetry uninteresting from an ethical point of view. 12 Relatedly, I
See, e.g., D. H. Fischer, 'Human Shields, Homicides, and House Fires: How a Domestic Law Analogy Can Guide
International Law Regarding Human Shield Tactics in Armed Conflict', American University Law Review (2008): 479-522;
E. Gross, 'Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a
Democratic State against Terrorism', Emory International Law Journal 16 (2002): 445-524; T. J. Koontz, 'Non-Combatant
Immunity in Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars', Ethics & International Affairs 11 (1997): 55-82; G. Øverland, 'Killing Civilians',
European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2005): 345-63; M. Skerker, 'Just War Criteria and the New Face of War: Human Shields,
Manufactured Martyrs, and Little Boys with Stones', Journal of Military Ethics 3 (2004): 27 - 39; N. J. Wheeler, 'Dying for
`Enduring Freedom': Accepting Responsibility for Civilian Casualties in the War against Terrorism', International Relations
16 (2002): 205-25.
10 Throughout the paper, I shall use the phrase ‘seek to use’, or ‘seek to force to’, to mean, ‘direct civilians to act in
certain ways, and imposing sanctions on them for refusing to comply.’
11 I will not address the question of whether W may use civilians from a third-party community. Whether they may do so
in large part depends on whether one believes that third parties have a right not to interfere in a military conflict between
some other communities. The issue is related to that of humanitarian intervention, though it differs from it in some
important respects.
12 This (admittedly controversial) assumption is one which I defend in Chapter 3 of the book. For ease of exposition, I
use here the simplified version of the moral inequality thesis (between just and unjust combatants). On the complex
9
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also assume that the fact that W’s cause is just does not entail that W may do whatever is necessary
to pursue it: if the end always did justify the means, asymmetrical tactics, as used by W, would be
equally uninteresting. I shall take it for granted that the end does not justify the means, and thus
focus on the task of exploring which means it allows.
Second, I will not discuss the case of voluntary shields such as third parties who do not
belong to either P or W and who willingly interpose themselves between warring factions. Although
W can properly be described as using those agents as shields, to the extent that they consent so to be
used and that their consent is free and fully informed, W does not act wrongly towards them.
Third, my argument in this paper unfolds against the background of a cosmopolitan theory
of justice. Cosmopolitanism can be broadly defined as the three-pronged view that (a) human beings
are the fundamental and primary loci for moral concern and respect and (b) have equal moral worth,
(c) whichever group (cultural, familial, ethnic and national) they belong to. It is, thus, individualist,
egalitarian, and universal, and insists that individuals’ basic entitlements should not be affected by
political borders. At the bar of cosmopolitan justice (or so I posit here), individuals wherever they
reside have human rights to the fundamental freedoms, and resources, which they need to leave a
minimally flourishing life. In addition, individuals qua group members have collective rights to (and,
by implication, collective duties in respect of) goods which can only be produced, or enjoyed,
collectively.
2. Using one’s own civilians
As I noted above, resorting to unwilling human shields is standardly condemned as morally
impermissible. At first sight, that seems to be correct. For as we have repeatedly seen throughout
this book, agents are generally not under a duty to rescue others from death when the cost to them
of doing so is as high as (inter alia) death or long-term, severe and debilitating injury or illness.
Suppose that someone, A, subjects another person, V, to a lethal threat. Suppose further that a third
party, S, is at the scene, and is not related to V nor has undertaken, by contract, to protect her.
Suppose, finally, that S will die if he shields V from A. Surely S is under a moral duty neither to step,
nor to remain, in the line of fire. For to require of S that he should take either of those courses of
actions would be to treat him merely as a means to someone else’s ends. That requirement, in turns,
is entirely out of place in a morality based on the importance of respecting agents as ends in
themselves. 13 By that token, then, V may not grab S and forcibly place him in front of her. That, in
fact, is precisely why agents may not kill bystanders in self-defence. Although, in the case of shields,
S dies at the hands of the attacker (if the latter persists in attempting to kill V), and not at the hands
of V, both attacker and victim treat S merely as means, and thus both act wrongly towards her. 14
version, you recall, combatants have the right to kill enemy combatants if, and only, they do so to forestall an unjust
threat; in so far as even just belligerents sometimes pose unjust threats to the enemy, it is false (or, at the very least, a
considerable oversimplification) to say that combatants’ right to kill (or, for that matter, their liability to attack) depends
on the moral status, in toto, of their war. For my purposes here, however, the oversimplification will do. Readers who do
not accept that it does should assume, instead, that W has a just cause for the specific acts of killing which it intends to
carry out – the question being that of the legitimacy of the means which it employs.
13 The claim that S is not under a duty to offer himself as a shield is compatible, of course, with the view that he may do
so. Note that I take my point (on S’s not being under that duty) to apply whether or not V has a gun. If it applies even if
V is strictly speaking defenceless, then it applies, a fortiori, if V has the means to (attempt to) defend herself.
14 Of course, the fact that V ‘merely’ (forcibly) uses S as a shield whereas A kills her (in some cases) is relevant to
judgements about their relative degrees of responsibility and culpability for S’s death. Thus, if A is morally innocent (for
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If the foregoing points are correct, it seems that civiliansW are not under a duty to shield
combatantsW from combatantsP and, moreover, that combatantsW may not force civiliansW to stand
in front of their tanks; nor may they choose as a battlefield densely populated refugee camps and
prevent refugees from leaving those camps; nor may they forcibly march those civilians into close
proximity to military objectives. For in so acting they would treat those civilians as means only to
their own (admittedly just) ends, which is impermissible.
But perhaps this is too quick. The objection to the forcible use of civilians as shields rests on
the general point that agents are not under an enforceable duty to die or suffer serious injury for the
sake of others: that, I suggested, is why S is not under an enforceable duty to stand or remain in the
line of fire between A and V. However, S’s case might be thought to differ in one crucial respect
from the case of human shields, to wit, that civiliansW are asked to incur high risks of harm, not for
the sake of other persons, but for the sake of prosecuting a war in the success of which they, as
members of W, have a strong interest. And in some cases, one might argue, conscripting individuals
into the army to fight such a war is permissible. Might that also apply to shields?
The standard (and most plausible) case for military conscription appeals to the moral
prohibition on free-riding – a prohibition which rests on the so-called principle of fairness. Broadly
put, the principle of fairness stipulates (inter alia) that agents are under a moral duty to contribute to
the costs and burdens attendant on the joint production of non-excludable public goods – goods, in
other words, such that they are necessarily enjoyed by all agents within the group whether or not
those agents contribute to them. An agent who enjoys the benefit of a public and non-excludable
good and who is in a position to contribute to its production but does not do so is guilty of the
wrongdoing of free-riding. In many cases, moreover, particularly when the benefits yielded by the
collective venture are important and the burdens shouldered by contributors onerous, there is a
strong case for enforcing the duty to contribute – as the best means to solve compliance problems.
Appositely, collective self-defence is a paradigmatic example of a good which is public, nonexcludable, yields crucially important benefits such as collective security, and whose production is
onerous, most obviously in war time – and onerous enough, in fact, to justify enforcing individuals’
moral duty to contribute to it. 15
The principle of fairness has been criticised on a number of grounds, the most important of
which is that it licences the coercive imposition of contributory costs upon anyone who benefits
from a collective venture, irrespective of her consenting to receiving such benefits and of the moral
status of the venture. 16 Furthermore, as applied to wartime conscription, the principle cannot, ex
post, justify coercing into contributing individuals who die on the battlefield, since they will not
benefit from the good of collective self-defence. Faced with the first objection, proponents of the
principle have sought to qualify it in the following ways: the collective venture must be just, and the
example, deeply psychotic), one might conclude that V bears a greater degree of moral responsibility for S’s death than
him. And so on. I shall return to the issue of intervening agency in section 4.
15 For formulations and defences of the principle of fairness, see, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, 'Are There Any Natural Rights?' The
Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 175-91, esp. p. 183; Rawls, A Theory of Justice 108-114; G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and
Political Obligation (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield, 1992); R. J. Arneson, 'The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider
Problems', Ethics 92 (1982): 616-33; R. Dagger, 'Membership, Fair Play, and Political Obligation', Political Studies 48
(2000): 104-17.
16 See, e.g., R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) esp. p. 93; D. McDermott, 'Fair-Play
Obligations', Political Studies - Journal of the Political Studies Association UK 52 (2004): 216-33; A. J. Simmons, 'The Principle
of Fair Play', Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (1979): 307-37.
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benefits it provides must be important enough that whether or not one consents to receiving them is
irrelevant to the determination of one’s obligations. (Similarly, a child, once adult, is plausibly
thought to be under an obligation to care for his elderly parents if they have brought him up with
love and care, even though he has not consented to receiving the benefits of their parental work.)
Moreover, in response to the second objection, the principle ought to stipulate that agents who are
coerced into contributing must stand at least a higher chance of benefitting from the collective
venture than not. As applied to collective self-defence, the principle of fairness thus generates an
obligation to contribute if, and only if, the war is just. In so far as a just war is one which is fought
for a just cause such as blocking serious rights violations, the benefits it confers are such that one is
under an enforceable duty to contribute to it, whether or not one has consented to having those
rights secured for oneself, and provided that one stands a higher chance than not, not merely of
surviving the war, but of enjoying a minimally flourishing life after the war. 17
Wartime military conscription is not antithetical to the central tenets of cosmopolitan justice,
in so far as the latter allows for the conferral of group rights on individual agents and, thereby, of
duties which they owe to fellow group members as joint participants in a collective venture from
which all are highly likely to benefit. Accordingly, the duty to take part in a (just) war of self-defence
should be seen, not as a duty to expose oneself to considerable risks for the sake of another person,
but as a duty not to free-ride on fellow members’ costly contribution to a mutually beneficial joint
venture. And it is precisely because the benefits are of considerable magnitude (to wit, the protection
of fundamental human rights at the hands of the enemy) and the costs of non-participation very
high (to wit, the violation of those rights) that enforcing the duty, through conscription, is legitimate.
Or so the standard argument goes.
If there is an enforceable duty to contribute to the war effort, as the case for war time
military conscription suggests, then it would seem that there is an enforceable moral duty to
contribute as a shield. 18 But more needs to be said here. For a start, the argument is an argument
about moral contributory duties. Accordingly, only those agents who can, in general, be regarded as
17 Those points imply that conscripting individuals into fighting duties is permissible only if those conditions are met. I am
happy to accept that. For accounts of military of conscription in the history of political thought, see, e.g., M. Walzer,
'The Obligation to Die for the State', in Michael Walzer (ed.), Obligations : essays on disobedience, war, and citizenship
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press., 1970); A. Carter, 'Liberalism and the Obligation to Military Service',
Political Studies - Journal of the Political Studies Association UK 46 (1998): 68-82; I. Z. Baron, Justifying the Obligation to Die: War,
Ethics, and Political Obligation with Illustrations from Zionism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009). For a justification of
conscription which circumscribes it to the protection of fundamental values such as liberty and rights, see, e.g., Rawls, A
Theory of Justice pp. 380-81; A. Gewirth, Human Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 251-53. Rawls’
position is interesting. Consider: ‘Conscription is permissible only if it is demanded for the defence of liberty itself,
including here not only the liberties of the citizens of the society in question, but also those of persons in other societies
as well. Therefore, if a conscript army is less likely to be an instrument of unjustified foreign adventures, it may be
justified on this basis alone despite the fact that conscription infringes upon the equal liberties of citizens.’ (380.) Rawls
does not tell us whether, on his view, conscription is justified as a means to wage a war of humanitarian intervention.
18 Walzer’s remarks on the status of civilians in besieged cities are particularly apposite here. As he puts it, ‘Civilians
performing essential services for the army will not, of course, be permitted to leave; they are in effect conscripted. Along with
the civilian heroes of the siege, they are henceforth legitimate objects of military attack.’18 In the case at hand, of course,
where ex hypothesi W is engaged in a just war, its civilians are not legitimate targets for P, even if they decide not to leave
the camp into which they reside and in which W draw the fight (to anticipate on points raised below). The interesting
point remains here that in so far as a contribution other than fighting needs to be made to the war effort, conscription
can extend to it as well.
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holders of that kind of duty can be held under a duty to act as a shield. This rules out using as
shields infants, the very elderly, the disabled, etc.
Moreover, the conclusion reached so far does not say that agents are under a moral duty to
offer themselves as defenceless shields. One might think that it does say precisely that. For as we saw at
the outset, the appeal of using shields as a tactics is that in so far as those shields are, or at least
appear to be, defenceless, they are likely to deter P from fighting, thereby narrowing its range of
options and, in turns, strengthening W’s hand. But we should resist that conclusion. Return to our
one-to-one case again. A subjects V to a wrongful lethal threat of harm. Suppose that, if S were to
stand in the line of fire, unarmed, A would desist, as a result of which no one would be killed.
Suppose further (to make the case closer to a war of self-defence) that S would benefit from the
attack being stopped. Is S under a duty so to act? If he knows for sure that A will stop, perhaps. But
in the highly likely event that he does not know for sure (he is not, after all, a mind reader), then we
could not hold him under a duty to step in unarmed – a duty, in other words, not merely to expose
himself to the risk that A will not be deterred but, in addition, to deny himself the means to protect
his own life should A carry on attacking. For to hold him under such a duty would, I believe,
significantly impair his chances of benefitting from the war, in violation of the aforementioned
qualifications to the principle of fairness. Thus, the considerations which support a contributory
duty to fight do not also support a contributory duty to offer oneself as a defenceless shield. But they
may well (it seems to me) support a duty to contribute by way of one’s deterring presence, as it were,
as a civilian, with the added point that, if P does not desist, one is clearly permitted to defend
oneself.
If the foregoing point is correct, it might in fact make the whole issue moot. For why not,
more straightforwardly, say that all agents on whom it is generally appropriate to impose
contributory duties are under a duty to serve in the army? For the simple reason that a community
simply cannot survive – indeed, cannot hope to win the war - if all its members are deployed to the
front. There are in short different ways in which to contribute to a war. Fighting is one such way.
Deflecting the enemy’s threats by helping to deter them to fight is another. That is what I mean, by
shielding.
Some loose ends need tying. First, one might think that the analogy between conscription
and the use of civilians as shields founders on the issue of enforcement. 19 If a conscript defaults on
her duty to serve, she will be punished, but she will not be sent back to the front. In the case of
shields, however, the situation seems very different. For when W take the fight into a densely
populated area, or use civilians’ occupied dwelling as shelters behind which they can fire at the
enemy, they in effect force their compatriots to provide the relevant service. It is not clear at all,
then, that the rationale for the enforceable duty to serve in the army for the sake of collective selfdefence can serve as a justification for W’s use of their own civilians as shields.
Note, however, that there are different ways in which a moral contributory duty can be
enforced: on the one hand, one might force the duty-bearer to provide the relevant service or
resource; on the other hand, one might impose penal sanctions on the duty-bearer falling short of,
or distinct from, the contribution itself. Thus, Paul’s failure to pay child maintenance might invite
enforcement in the form of direct and forcible extraction by the state of what he owes to his son.
His repeated failure to show up for parental visits might invite enforcement in the form of forcible
19

I am deeply grateful to Vinit Haksar for pressing me on this.
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attendance. There are good reasons, in fact, to resist the view that a dereliction of a moral duty to
provide a service or to perform a task may be redressed by forcing the agent to do the latter. Simply
put, the prohibition on forced labour supports jettisoning a requirement of specific performance.
Thus, to say that a moral duty to provide a service is enforceable is to say that failure to fulfil the
duty will result in sanctions of some kind, falling short of actually providing that service. With that
point in hand, the analogy between conscripting individuals into the army and using them as shields
stands: the set of considerations which support a contributory (enforceable) moral duty on the part
of citizens towards collective self-defence in wartime also support a contributory (enforceable)
moral duty on the part civiliansW to serve as shields in prosecution of their community’s just war of
collective self-defence – at least under the aforementioned risks- and costs- related conditions. This
implies that they are under a moral duty not to desert, as it were, i.e. by leaving the area. If they
resist, or seek to leave, then, just as a government may not force its conscripts into actual fighting,
W’s regime or leaders may not force them to stay, but may subject them to some sanction (assuming
that this would be feasible) – just as military commanders who defend a besieged city may not
prevent its inhabitants from leaving. 20
Second, the cosmopolitan account of war I have defended so far presents a difficulty for
conscription which is particularly acute when brought to bear on the issue of shields. As I have
argued elsewhere, at the bar of cosmopolitan morality, it is not a necessary condition for a war to be
just that it be waged by a legitimate authority such as a state, a coalition of states, supra-national
institutions or quasi-state forces such as recognised national liberation movements. 21 On that view, it
would seem that any belligerent has the right to coerce its members into contributing to a just war if
the latter are to benefit from the goods which it would secure: thus, a small guerrilla force locked
into a lethal conflict with a genocidal regime seemingly has the right to force potential victims of
that regime to fight, as if it were a state. However, if one is to confer any normative weight at all on
the character of the procedures by which individuals are subject to coercion, one ought to reject that
implication of the cosmopolitan account of the ad bellum requirement of legitimate authority. Thus,
narrowing the reach of the principle of fairness to just collective ventures does not merely mean that
one is only under an enforceable duty to contribute to just outcomes; it also suggests that one is only
under a duty to comply with the demands of one’s fellow members as mediated by procedurally just
institutions. Such institutions are characterized by transparency, democratic accountability, and
respect for human rights. Accordingly, if W does not meet those conditions, it may not enforce their
duty to fight or, by that token, to act as shields (however remote the risk of death). That implies, for
example (and perhaps controversially), that conscription as carried out by the USSR during WWII
was illegitimate; it also implies – relevantly to new wars – that belligerents such as para-military

20 On sieges and the right to leave, see, e.g., Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (note that Walzer claims that civilian inhabitants
who provide essential services to a besieged army should be regarded as conscripts, and not permitted to leave. See
p.168.) I have not addressed here the issue of conscientious objections – about which I have expressed scepticism
elsewhere in connection with the duty to kill in defence of others. (See C. Fabre, 'Mandatory Rescue Killings', Journal of
Political Philosophy 15 (2007): 363-84.) Let me simply say that, if an agent is allowed to opt out of ‘conventional’ wartime
military service on conscientious grounds, then mutatis mutandis, a conscientious objector should be exonerated from a
duty to serve as a shield. Note that this is not the same as to say that W ought not to force a civilian to do his duty, since
in this case, unlike in the case of the conscientious objector, the civilian is under a duty to serve.
21 See 'Cosmopolitanism, just war theory and legitimate authority', International Affairs 84 (2008): 963-76.
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groups, bands of guerrilleros and self-appointed liberation movements which lack those procedures
may not force hitherto civilians into either the battlefield or shielding positions. 22
3. Using the enemy’s civilians as shields
I have argued so far that, if one believes that military conscription for the sake of collective selfdefence is permissible, then, mutatis mutandis, so is the use by W of its civilians as shields. Suppose
now that W use as shields civilians who belong to P. Such tactics are more likely to succeed than the
use of one’s own members, since P might be more reluctant to kill its own members in prosecution
of its war. In that particular case, of course, conscription as defined and justified in section 2 cannot
support the claim that civiliansP are under a moral duty to serve as shields. 23 Is it to say, then, that
they have a right that W not use them in such ways? I can think of two reasons for resisting that
conclusion. First, as I noted above, belligerents usually resort to human shields for two purposes:
either to deter their enemy from targeting their combatants, or, should their enemy decide to press
ahead with their campaign (thereby killing civilian shields), to reap the propaganda benefits of public
outcry. Suppose, then, that combatantsW have very good reasons to believe that combatantsP will
refrain from fighting in densely populated areas, or will desist from bombing military facilities near
which civiliansP have been placed. In this particular case, W are not exposing those civilians to a risk
of death or serious injury, which opens the door, at least at first sight, to conferring on them a right
to do so.
Suppose now that W seek to march civiliansP towards military targets, or to force them to
stand in front of its tank (and imposes penalties on them for refusing to comply). In that case, W do
seek to impose on them the costs inherent on forcible movement or displacement. Unless one
thinks that it is never permissible to seek to force anyone to do anything or be anywhere for the sake
of furthering the rights of another person – a rather implausible view, and one to which I will return
presently – one must accept that, in this particular case at least, W might be said not to act wrongly
(which implies, thus, that civiliansP do not have a right that W desist.) Moreover, if all that W do is
fight from areas in which those civilians already reside and which they can leave, and does so in the
verified knowledge that P will not take the fight there (as happened, it seemed, in the
aforementioned Rwanda case), then it is equally unclear that it is acting wrongly towards those
civilians (which, here again, implies that those civiliansP lack the corresponding right against W). 24
22 The claim is compatible with the view that they may fight on their behalf. On military conscription carried out by a
non-state actor, see Baron, Justifying the Obligation to Die 171-72. Baron discusses proposals put forward by Zionist
organisations in 1948 to conscript all Jewish refugees (aged 17 to 35) from Displaced Persons Camps into the army of
the as-yet-not-existing state of Israel. Two particularly contentious points were the control exerted by Hagannah (a paramilitary organisation of dubious legitimacy) over security matters in general and the proposed draft in particular, and the
suggestion that Jews who were in Europe, not in Palestine, should be conscripted. The proposal was not put into effect.
23 Unless, of course, W wage a war of humanitarian intervention against P’s regime, in defence of the latter’s population.
It might well be permissible, at least in some cases of HI, for the intervening party to impose on those civilians some of
the costs attendant on rescuing them – in which case using them as shields to protect combatantsw might sometimes be
permissible. Note, though, that in so far as, in that case, P’s regime and army are indifferent to the plight of its own
civilians (ex hypothesi), they are not likely to desist just because the latter are interposed in the line of fire. Whether W may
use those civilians as shields is tantamount to asking whether they may expose them to a very high risk of dying for the
sake of their own liberation – an issue which I addressed in section 2.
24 To be clear, I am not suggesting that the militias were prosecuting a just war: I am merely highlighting a salient feature
of the tactics they used.
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To be sure, it is very unlikely, as a matter of fact, that P will desist from fighting altogether,
and much more likely that it will exercise greater caution in its selection of targets. 25 And in so far as
P will not stop fighting altogether, W themselves will expose civiliansP, not merely to the harm
attendant on, e.g., forcible displacement, but also to the risk of being killed in the crossfire. In the
next section, I will address the moral status of W’s resort to human shields in the light of the harms
which the latter thereby suffer at the hands of P. Here, I focus on the moral status of W’s decision
in the light of the harm which they themselves inflict on shields.
The question, then, is whether W are acting wrongly by exposing civiliansP to the risk of
dying at their hands in the crossfire - in addition to imposing on them, in some cases, the sanctions
attendant on refusing to move as direct by combatantsW. Some people believe that it is always wrong
to seek to force someone to do something for the sake of a stranger. A fortiori, on that view, it is
always wrong to seek to force someone to run a risk of death or serious injury for the sake of
another – however minute the risk. As I have argued elsewhere, however, such a staunch
commitment to individuals’ personal prerogatives is highly implausible, particularly when coupled (as
it usually is) with an equally staunch commitment to holding agents under an enforceable duty to
give material resources to those in need. 26 If that is correct, then to the extent that cosmopolitans
endorse enforceable duties of distributive justice across borders, they cannot subscribe to the view
that for W to use civiliansP as shields in prosecution of its just war is morally wrong irrespective of
the degree of risk which those civilians would thereby run. Now, I do not know what counts as an
acceptable risk, and doubt that one could plausibly reach such a judgement in general terms (as
opposed to come to those judgements, through a process of reflective equilibrium, in very specific
examples.) The lesson to draw from this discussion, however, is that, in principle, a theory of
cosmopolitan justice wedded to a group-membership-independent duty of assistance cannot rule out
the view that W sometimes acts permissibly when conscripting civilians as shields, even if the latter
belong to P. However, cosmopolitan justice is also compatible (when combined with a fairness-based
argument in favour of conscription) with the view that the risks to which combatantsW may expose
civiliansP whilst using them as shields ought to be lower than those to which it exposes its own
civilians, precisely because the war is conducted on latter’s behalf, who, unlike the former, can be
said directly to benefit from its successful completion.
Second, even if the foregoing points are unsound, it does not strike me as wholly implausible
to suggest that two (possibly overlapping) categories of civilians, within P, might be liable to being
used as shields by W - to wit, those civilians who share causal and moral responsibility for the
wrongdoings which gave W its just cause for going to war, and those who share causal and moral
responsibility for the fact that their community chose to wage war against W instead of putting a
stop to those wrongdoings. 27 Suppose, for the sake of argument, that those civilians’ degree of
There is evidence that the US-led coalition sought to do precisely that during the First Gulf War. See, e.g., E. J.
Marolda and Schneller, Robert John, Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1998) pp. 245ff. NATO-led forces and US-lead forces faced similar dilemmas during, respectively,
the air campaign in Kosovo (1995) and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2002). See, e.g., Wheeler, 'Dying for
`Enduring Freedom': Accepting Responsibility for Civilian Casualties in the War against Terrorism', . It is likely that
those belligerents would have taken even greater care had the shields been members of their own community.
26 C. Fabre, Whose Body Is It Anyway? Justice and the Integrity of the Person (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) esp. chs 23.
27 In this paragraph and the next, I use the label ‘civilian’, as opposed to ‘civilians’, to denote the fact that those
individuals are not wholly innocent either of the initial wrongdoings(s) or of P’s subsequent unjust war.
25
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responsibility for P’s unjust war against W is not high enough to warrant the loss of their right not to
be killed deliberately. 28 Still, they might be liable to incurring other costs – such as the costs
attendant on running a risk of dying, or of being deprived of some essential freedoms. Return to our
earlier, one-to-one case, where V uses S as a shield to protect herself from A at t2, and suppose that
S had culpably exposed V to A’s attack at t1 (for example by luring her under false pretence to his
house knowing that A was lying in wait). It seems to me that V would not wrong S by using her as a
shield, at least if uses him in that way causes A to desist (for example because S is A’s partner and A
does not want to shoot through him, etc.) 29 Mutatis mutandis, then, it is not clear (at least, not to me)
that combatantsw may never use civiliansP as shields in prosecution of their just war, at least in those
cases where combatantsP will, as a result, desist from (wrongfully) attacking the former and where,
therefore, the lives of civiliansP will also be spared.
Let me tie up a couple of loose ends before addressing the difficulties raised by the fact that,
quite often, P, as much as W, will likely harm shields. In this section and the previous one, I spoke
of a moral duty to assist W’s just war effort by serving as shields. Consequently, the justification I
offered for W’s tactics only applies to those beings on whom it makes sense to impose moral duties
– and not, for example, to very young infants, or severely mentally disabled or impaired individuals.
Generally, however, the fact that one cannot be described as being under a moral duty to do x is
compatible with the claim that third parties are at liberty to make one to x: thus, the fact that my cat
cannot be described as being under a moral duty to step away from my plate and let me eat my diner
is compatible with my being at liberty to (gently) push him out of the way. The question thus
remains open as to whether W may permissibly use human beings who are not moral agents as
shields, or whether they would wrong them in so doing. The latter claim does seem the right
position to take. To press a vulnerable human being into service for the sake of one’s ends, however
just, who is not in any position whatsoever to understand what is being done to them, and to
thereby expose them to some risk of harm does seem wrong, even if the risk is one which they could
be held under a moral duty to do if they were moral agents. The very disabled, infants, very young
children, and those who suffer from severe cognitive disorders, are the most vulnerable of all, and
ought not to be subjected to a worse predicament still, by being made to provide assistance to those
who are, for all intents and purposes, better off than they are.
4. Shields and the problem of intervening agency
So far I have focused on the grounds upon which W may permissibly harm civilians by (coercively)
using them as shields. In many cases, however, W’s decision to resort to such tactics will expose
shields to the risk of being harmed by P. The fact that some agent other than W intervenes in the
chain of events which leads to shields’ predicament raises the following difficulty. As we saw, a risk
of death, as distinct from death itself, is a cost that agents do, and indeed (as we saw above) may be
asked to, incur for the sake of others. But suppose that the risk of dying which shields incur at the
hands of combatantsP is higher than the risk which combatantsW may themselves impose on them
when they (for example) take the fight into densely populated areas. To revert to our earlier case,
28 For arguments along those lines, see, e.g., J. McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), esp. ch.
5, and my ‘Guns, Food, and Liability to Attack in War’, Ethics 120 (2010): 36-63, section V.
29 If one believes that V may kill S in self-defence as a means to stop A (particularly if she would stand a better chance of
surviving the attack than by attempting to kill A directly), then V may use S as a shield even if A would almost certainly
shoot through S.
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suppose that V permissibly imposes on S the cost (in terms of loss of freedom of movement and of
risk of being killed by one of V’s bullets) of standing in the line of fire, by shielding behind him;
suppose further that there is a higher risk that S will be killed by A than he will be killed by V;
suppose, finally, that the former risk is higher than any risk that V herself would have been
permitted to impose on S had V herself caused the resulting harm. May V use S as a shield in that
particular case?
Note that the problem of intervening agency – which is at the heart of the question - is
problematic not merely for civiliansW, who are more likely to be harmed by combatantsP, but also for
civiliansP (who are innocent) and civiliansP (who share moral and causal responsibility for W’s
predicament), since none of those categories of agents are liable to being killed deliberately. I shall
assume, for the purpose of this discussion, that the risk which civilians incur to being killed by
combatantsP is higher than the risks which combatantsW may impose on them, even though those
latter risks differ depending on whether or not they are civiliansW who are properly regarded by W as
conscripts, or wholly innocent civiliansP, and so on.
The problem of intervening agency might be thought to dissolve once either one of the
following two lines of thought is brought into view. 30 On the one hand, some might say that, in so
far as, ex hypothesi, combatantsw themselves are not imposing on shields an impermissible cost or risk of
cost, and in so far as they do not intend for P to kill the shields, they share no responsibility for the
latter’s death at the hands of P, and thus may so act. On that view, agents are morally responsible for
the imposition of a harm if, and only if, they themselves perform the act which results in the harm.
That implies that, for example, you share no moral responsibility for the ensuing forest fire if you
throw a lighted cigarette into a bucket in full knowledge that there is a high risk that someone else
will subsequently pour petrol on it. 31 But there is an obvious difficulty with that first line of thought,
to wit, that it regards as incoherent the very notions of accessory liability for, and conspiracy in,
wrongdoing. I believe that this is too high a cost to pay, and that one should reject that view as
implausible. Accordingly, it does not follow from the fact that combatantsW do not themselves
wrongfully harm shields that they may expose them to a higher risk of harm than they would
themselves have been permitted to impose on them had they caused the harm directly. 32
One the other hand, others might say that one may not act in such a way that others will
suffer, at the hands of an intervening agent, a harm or risk of harm which one is not, oneself,
30 What follows is a very brief sketch of one of the thorniest areas of moral and legal philosophy. For good discussions
of intervening agency, see M. J. Zimmerman, 'Intervening Agents and Moral Responsibility', The Philosophical Quarterly 35
(1985): 347-58, and F. M. Kamm, 'Responsibility and Collaboration', Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (1999): 169-204.
(Kamm frames her discussion within the context of a broader study of the moral differences between killing and letting
die.) For a fascinating study of individuals’ responsibility for collectively imposed harms, see C. Kutz, Complicity : Ethics
and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Finally, good criminal law
textbooks usually have much to say about the philosophical underpinnings of the doctrines of conspiracy and accessory
liability, both of which revolve around intervening agency. See, e.g., A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th edn.;
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), and A. P. Simester and G. R. Sullivan, Criminal Law- Theory and Doctrine (2nd
edn.; Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003). Hart and Honoré’s Causation in the Law remains a classic. (H. L. A. Hart and A. M.
Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).
31 See Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law , p. 69, for the example.
32 And in fact, under customary international law, the ultimate responsibility for civilian casualties which result from a
belligerent’s illegal use of shields fall on that belligerent, not on the party which actually kills those civilians. See Y.
Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 130. I am grateful to Chehtman for bringing this reference to my attention.
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allowed to inflict on them. On that view, the moral status of one’s actions wholly supervenes on the
moral status of intervening agents’ acts. Now, under the aforementioned conditions, where you
know that someone will lit up the whole bucket and cause a forest fire, it is plausible to hold you
morally responsible for the fire. Suppose, however, that your clothes have begun to catch fire as a
result of someone else throwing the lit cigarette in your direction; and suppose, moreover, that you
can avoid burning to death only by placing them in the bucket. Even if you know that there is a high
risk that someone else will subsequently pour petrol in the bucket, thereby starting a forest fire, it is
not clear that you have acted impermissibly. As applied to war, the ‘dependence view’ implies, for
example, that the victim of an unwarranted military aggression may not defend itself, or stay in the
war, if it can foresee that the enemy will, in all likelihood, deliberately target its civilian populations
(thus inflicting on the latter a harm which the victim of the aggression itself is clearly not permitted
to impose.) By that token, Britain was not permitted to defend itself against Germany in WWII –
which, given all that we know about Nazi Germany and the circumstances under which Britain
found itself at war, seems utterly absurd.
Articulating water-tight conditions under which W may use civilians as shields in cases where
the problem of intervening agency raises its intimidating head is beyond the scope of this chapter.
As a first, rough cut, though, the foregoing considerations suggest that the permissibility of using
civilians as shields, knowing that they are likely to be wrongfully subjected to serious harms by the
enemy, partly depends on the justness of one’s cause, whether using them as shields is necessary to
one’s just ends, whether one is prepared to defend those shields from the enemy, and whether their
deaths or maiming satisfies the proportionality requirement for war.
5. Asymmetrical warfare, fair play and the erosion of non-combatant immunity
To recapitulate, I have argued that W may sometimes use civilians from either sides as shields, in
prosecuting its just war against P. A standard objection to human shields (and, indeed, to
asymmetrical tactics in general) as used by military weak belligerents against their conventionally
more powerful foes is that they are unfair to the latter. W, it is argued, imposes on P the burden of
not being able to defend itself (for example, of not being able to shoot through the shields, or
pursue W into refugee camps), and benefits from P’s compliance (or, as the case may be, costly (to
P) non-compliance) with the principle of non-combatant immunity; at the same time, it itself refuses
to shoulder that burden. As critics of asymmetrical tactics sometimes put it, W is not ‘fighting fair’,
or ‘free-rides’ on P’s respect for the moral restraints on war. In Churchill’s memorable words, put to
the British cabinet in the early stages of the war, and recorded in his memoirs, ‘It would not be right
that the aggressive power should gain one set of advantages by tearing up all laws, and another set
by sheltering behind the innate respect for law of its opponent.’ 33 Replace ‘aggressive powers’ with
‘weak powers’, and you get the fair play objection to asymmetrical tactics.
The objection, which draws support from the widely shared intuition that free-riding is
morally wrong, conceives of war as if it were a sporting contest in which the following three
conditions obtain which together generate an obligation to abide by the rules of the contest: (a) the
equality condition, whereby no player has a greater claim than other players to win or lose; (b) the
consent condition, whereby by taking part in the contest, both players consent to playing by the rules;
W. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 2005), page number. See also T. Meisels,
'Combatants: Lawful and Unlawful', Law and Philosophy 26 (2007): 31-65.
33
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and (c) the mutual benefit condition, whereby the rules operate to the advantage of both players. 34 If no
football team has a greater claim to win the tournament than any other, if all players willingly take
part, and if the rules operate to the advantage of all, then all must obey by the rules of the game,
such as, for example, not handling the ball, not playing off-side, etc.
The claim that free-riding is morally wrong is at the heart of my limited defence of the use of
W of (some of) its non-combatant as shields, and one might think, therefore, that my argument (at
least at that juncture) is particularly vulnerable to the fair-play objection. Admittedly, on the
orthodox account of the moral status of soldiers, it may well make sense to see war, for all its
atrocities, as relevantly similar to a game. For on that view, once the war has started, soldiers are
equally at liberty to kill one another (subject to the requirements of proportionality and necessity),
and are under an equal obligation not to kill civilians (condition (a)). By consenting to take part in
the war, belligerents signal their consent to abide by the rules of war and in particular the principle
of non-combatant immunity - which are different from the rules of, say, policing (condition (b)).
Finally, the rules work to the advantage of both parties in so far as compliance with them minimizes
the damage and destruction caused by the war (condition (c)). According to the fair play objection,
by resorting to tactics which blur the distinction between combatants and civilians as a means to
blunt P’s effectiveness, W subvert this mechanism and put P at a serious disadvantage (in breach of
(a)). They participate in the war yet do not respect its rules (in breach of (b)), and they benefit from
P’s willingness to abide by the rules whilst placing them at a serious disadvantage (so that, pace (c),
the advantage of compliance clearly is not mutual.) In so doing, the objection maintains, W are
acting wrongly towards their enemy.
Yet, the objection is not persuasive. For a start, it clearly begs the question since it
presupposes exactly that which is at issue, to wit, that the rules of war include an absolute
prohibition on such tactics as discussed here. 35 Moreover, in the kinds of conflict which I discuss
here, neither of those three conditions obtain. 36 Consider first the equality condition. As I posit in
this paper, soldiers are not morally on a par once the war has started, and thus do not have equal
liberties to kill one another. Rather, whether or not they are permitted to kill other soldiers depends
(in large part) on the justness of their war ad bellum, so that just combatants have a claim to kill
unjust combatants, and thereby to win the war, but unjust combatants certainly lack such claim. That
There are two ways in which they could be said to benefit from compliance with the rules. If the rules are constitutive of
the game, they enjoy the benefit of playing that game so defined (thus, the no-hand-on the-ball rule is constitutive of
football in the sense that if all players handled the ball, the game played would not be football.) If the rules are regulative of
the game, they enjoy the benefit of playing a game with, e.g., minimised risk of injury (through respecting the no-kickingdown-your-opponent rule), good compromise between scoring opportunities and defensive play (through the off-side
rule, etc.) The rules of war are clearly regulative – not constitutive: a so-called total war, which is characterised by the
absence of compliance with most rules, remains a war. For a classic account of the distinction between constitutive and
regulative rules, see J. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1969). For a useful discussion of the distinction in the context of adversarial ethics, see A. I. Applbaum, Ethics for
Adversaries - the Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), ch. 5.
35 As Chehtman incisively pointed out to me.
36 Note that my critique of the mainstream conception of war as a sporting contest differs from McMahan’s. McMahan
argues that, pace the sporting context analogy, it does not follow from the fact that combatants consent to participate in
the war that they consent to being killed by enemies whose war is unjust (whereas someone who takes part in, e.g., a
boxing match clearly consents to being hit.) My focus is not on whether W consent to being killed by P but whether they
consent to respecting the principle of non-combatant immunity. (See McMahan, Killing in War , 51-57. See also Coady,
Morality and Political Violence , 128ff, for criticisms of the sporting contest model in the context of unequal war.)
34
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point constitutes a decisive reply to the fair play objection, for in so far as unjust combatants lack a
claim to win the war, they are not owed a duty by just combatants to be placed on an equal footing.
It is worth nothing, however, that the consent condition does not fare much better. It is true, of
course, that W may well consent to fight P. However, given that the alternative to waging the war is
to (continue to) suffer a wrongdoing which is severe enough, ex hypothesi, to constitute a just cause
for war, W’s consent to taking part in the war cannot be deemed to generate an obligation (to the
enemy) to expose oneself to the risk of suffering further wrongdoing by taking a military superior
unjust enemy on the latter’s own terms.
Finally, although adversaries in sports clearly benefit from each other’s compliance with the
rules of the game, in a war where one party is vastly superior in conventional power than the other,
it is not clear at all what the latter gains by observing the rules of war in general and those pertaining
to non-combatant immunity in particular. W benefits from observing the principle, it might be
thought, in so far as its more likely, in so doing, to minimise non-combatant deaths. Thus, if W uses
civiliansP as shields, not only is it more likely that their enemy will do the same with civiliansW, but it
is also likely that, over time, they will shoot through those shields in order to kill combatantsW and,
more generally, abandon their commitment to the principle of non-combatant immunity.
Whether the use of shields have tended to erode belligerents’ willingness to respect the
principle of non-combatant immunity remains an open question. The crucial issue, however, is
whether W would gain more by fighting the war on P’s military terms than by resorting to such
tactics. It is unclear that it necessarily would. For consider. W has three options: (1) W can fight on
P’s terms, in which case (ex hypothesi) it will lose the war, and its members will continue to suffer
severe rights violations, both as individuals and as group members; (2) W does not go to war against
P in the first instance, knowing that it cannot win by resorting to conventional means of warfare, in
which case too its members will remain victims of the severe, ongoing rights violations which
provided it with a just cause; or (3) W fights the war on asymmetrical (as opposed to unequal) terms,
in which case (ex hypothesi) it will win the war and stop, perhaps even obtain redress for, the
wrongdoings suffered by its members. If W decides to fight its war by asymmetrical means, it can be
said not to gain from its decision to violate the rules if, and only if, the loss of non-combatant lives
from its side (resulting from its use of such tactics) is disproportionate in relation to the just cause,
so that W would have been better off not waging the war in the first instance, or waging the war on
P’s terms. Whether that is so is entirely contingent on the facts of the case. By that token, it is only
contingently true that W and P both gain by observing the principle of non-combatant immunity, and
it is thus only contingently the case that a war displays the third feature of the sporting contest
model which is at the heart the fair play objection to asymmetrical tactics. Accordingly, even if
(contrary to what I have, in fact, claimed) W’s war against P meets the conditions of equality and
consent, in those cases where W does not stand to gain by observing the principle of non-combatant
immunity, it is not under an obligation to P not to use those tactics.
That said, the foregoing points might be thought to suggest that W, in so doing, wrongs its
own civilians, since it exposes them to the risk either that P might decide deliberately and knowingly
to violate the principle, in retaliation for W’s own violation (as, in fact, Britain did throughout WWII
when bombing German cities), or that they might be led to take less care when attempting to
discriminate between combatants and civilians. One of the most interesting, and least studied,
questions raised by the conduct of war is, precisely, that of what counts as an acceptable distribution
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of risks and costs between combatants and civilians from the same side, in prosecution of a just
cause. I suggested in section 2 and 3 that agents are sometimes under a duty to incur a risk of serious
harm, either on conscription-related grounds, or in virtue of a general duty of assistance. Those
remarks, together with the points made in connection with the problem of intervening agency in
section 4, support the suggestion that W may sometimes expose its civilians to the aforementioned
risks and costs.
6. Conclusion.
To conclude, I have argued that, given certain assumptions about the scope of, and justification for,
our duties to other agents, notably duties to provide assistance, the near-universal moral
condemnation which the resort to human shields elicits is not always warranted – at least in those
cases where the belligerent who uses human shields is militarily weaker than its enemy, cannot win
the war in any other way, and wages a just war. It remains to be seen, inter alia, whether a military
powerful and just belligerent may also use civilians, whether on its side or not, against a militarily
weaker, and unjust, foe. I do not address this issue here. For now at least, I must postpone this
particular line of inquiry.

